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In Escobedo, the Supreme Court required that an individual be
warned of his right to remain silent when the investigation focused on
the accused, i.e., when it shifted from the investigatory to the accusatory
stage.28 Without exception, the authorities have regarded Miranda as a
liberalization of the rights assured in Escobedo.29 A questioned individual
must now be informed of his rights whenever he has been substantially
deprived of his freedom of action whether or not the accusatory stage
has been reached. In the instant case, the accusatory stage had obviously
been reached before any questions were asked, yet the New York Court
of Appeals held that the accused need not have been warned of his
rights. It is possible that this decision deprived the accused of rights
he had before the Miranda decision.
Constitutional Law-THE

RIGHT OF A LABOR UNION TO PROVIDE

A program whereby District
Twelve of the United Mine Workers of America furnished its members free legal counsel in presenting their individual workman's compensation claims to the Illinois Industrial Commission resulted in a
charge of unauthorized practice of law against the union.' Under the
FREE LEGAL COUNSEL TO MEMBERS.

lieve that he would be detained until he answered and that he had been significantly
deprived of his freedom of action. Id. at 8-9, 233 N.E.2d at 262-63, 286 N.Y.S.2d at
235-36.
The dissent went so far as to say that police intent to arrest, alone, was a sufficient
reason to find that an individual had been deprived of his freedom in a significant
way. See also People v. Reason, 52 Misc.2d 425, 276 N.Y.S.2d 196 (Sup. Ct. 1966);
Commonwealth v. Jefferson, 423 Pa. 541, 226 A.2d 765 (1967).
28. See note 6 supra. Escobedo was generally restricted to its facts. Birnbaum v.
United States, 356 F.2d 856 (8th Cir. 1966); United States v. Cone, 354 F.2d 119 (2d
Cir. 1965); United States v. Childress, 347 F.2d 448 (7th Cir. 1965); United States v.
Konigsberg, 336 F.2d 844 (3d Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 933 (1964); People v.
Hartgraves, 31 IM. 2d 375, 202 NXE.2d 33 (1964); Commonwealth v. Tracy, 207 N.E.2d
16 (1965); State v. Coleman, 46 NJ. 16, 214 A.2d 393 (1965); People v. Gunner, 15
N.Y.2d 226, 205 N.E.2d 852, 257 N.Y.S.2d 204 (1965); Biddle v. Commonwealth, 206
Va. 14, 141 S.E.2d 710 (1965); Browne v. State, 24 Wis.2d 491, 131 N.W2.d 169 (1964).
Contra, People v. Dorado, 40 Cal. Rptr. 264, 394 P.2d 952 (1964), rev'd on rehearing,
42 Cal. Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 361 (1965). The Miranda decision actually determined four
different cases (Miranda v. Arizona, Westover v. United States, California v. Stewart,
and Vigera v. New York); therefore, Miranda could nor be restricted to a single set
of facts. Perhaps, the Supreme Court implied by this that Escobedo should not be so
restricted, either.
29. E.g., Kamisar, A Dissent from the Miranda Dissents, 65 MicmG"t L. REv. 59
(1966).

1. United Mine AWorkers of America, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 88 S.Ct. 353
(1967).
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program, a salaried attorney selected by the union's executive board
automatically filed a complaint with the Industrial Commission upon a
member's reporting injuries to the legal department. All necessary
forms were processed by the union office with the attorney usually not
2
meeting his client prior to their appearance before the commission.
After the Illinois Supreme Court issued an injunction against the
United Mine Workers,3 the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari4 to determine whether the Illinois court's ruling conflicted with
the recent Supreme Court decisions in NAACP v. Button5 and Brother6
hood of RailroadTrainmen v. Virginia.

In United Mine Workers of America, District 12 v. Illinois State Bar
Association,7 the Supreme Court reversed the Illinois ruling and held
that the first amendment freedoms of speech, petition and assembly 8 do
include the right of a labor union to retain a salaried attorney to represent its members in individual workman's compensation suits."
Prior to the Supreme Court's recent change of position, courts consistently held that organizations did not have a right to provide legal
counsel to members 10 on the ground that such practices violated canons
of professional ethics." Such courts stressed their own power and duty
2. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12, 35 I11.2d 112,
114-15, 219 NE.2d 503, 504-05 (1966); 65 MicH. L. REv. 805 (1967).
3. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12, 35 Ill.2d
112, 219 N.E.2d 503 (1966).
4. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 386 U.S. 941
(1967).
5. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
6. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
7. 88 S.Ct. 353 (1967).
8. "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or of the
press; or of the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." U. S. CoNsr. amend. I. The first amendment
freedoms were made applicable to the states by the fourteenth amendment. See U. S.
CONsT. amend. XIV.

9. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12 v. Ill. State Bar Ass'n, 88 S.Ct. 353,
358 (1967).
10. E.g., In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Ill.2d 391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958);
People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 IMI.50, 199 N.E. 1 (1935);
Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Auto. Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 A. 139 (1935); see
Hildebrand v. State Bar of Cal., 36 Cal.2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950).
11. Generally the charges in such cases arose from alleged violations of Canons 27
(solicitation), 28 (stirring up litigation), 35 (intermediaries), and 47 (aiding in unauthorized practice of law) of the ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs, the general
provisions of which are often incorporated into state statutes. See ILL. REv. STATS. ch. 13.
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to regulate the legal profession, 12 often ignoring the individual rights of
organization members. Typical of the earlier cases were those involving
automobile clubs' furnishing legal counsel to members, 3 and the numerous cases involving the legal aid department of the Brotherhood of
4
Railroad Trainmen.1
Early in the 1960's two Supreme Court cases, NAACP v. Button 5
and Brotherhoodof RailroadTrainmen v. Virginia,' altered the Court's
position in this area. The first of these, Button, was grounded on the
Court's allowing constitutionally guaranteed individual freedoms to prevail over the state's interest in policing legal ethics.' 7 The NAACP legal
12. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Goodman, 366 IM. 346, 349, 8 N.E.2d 941,
944 (1937); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Auto. Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 A. 139, 142
(1935).
13. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Chicago Motor Club, 362 IMI.50, 199 N.E. 1
(1935); Rhode Island Bar Ass'n v. Auto. Service Ass'n, 55 R.I. 122, 179 A. 139 (1935);
Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE L.J. 966 (1967).
14. While the operations of the Brotherhood's legal aid department have varied
from time to time and area to area, prior to 1959 the program consisted generally
of attorneys in sixteen regions throughout the country who had been selected by the
union and who had agreed to handle all union member claims for a set low fee,
usually a flat twenty-five per cent. In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 ll.2d
391, 150 N.E.2d 163 (1958). Included was the agreement that the attorneys would
pay all operating costs of the union's legal aid department office and the costs incurred by union members in investigating accidents. In return for such consideration
on his part, the lawyer was assured a large enough volume of business to justify the low
fee. See Hildebrand v. State Bar of Cal., 36 Cal.2d 504, 225 P.2d 508 (1950). This
large volume of business was assured by the local investigators' virtual solicitation of
claims on behalf of the regional counsel by such practices as the investigators' furnishing the lawyer's employment contract forms to injured parties. In re Brotherhood of
R.R. Trainmen, supra. The charges brought against attorneys serving as counsel to
the Brotherhood usually stemmed from these solicitation practices, but under certain
types of programs the attorneys were also liable for splitting fees with the union.
In re O'Neill, 5 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1933).
In a marked change from earlier courts, the Illinois Supreme Court in 1958 set forth
an alternative plan which would be acceptable to that court. That Illinois decision
recognized the union's right to recommend specific attorneys but forbade any financial
connections between such attorneys and the union. In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, supra at 167. While the Illinois holding could be interpreted as an indication of
a liberalization in the control of group practice, that decision is distinguished from the
later United States Supreme Court decisions by one notable factor: the consideration
of the first amendment rights of the litigants, the very basis of the later holdings, is
given no importance in the Illinois decision.
15. 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
16. 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
17. Button presented a good occasion for the Court to establish the right of organization members to provide themselves with legal counsel. First, Button came before
the Court at a time when the Court was acutely aware of the Negro community's
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plan upheld by the Court involved the organization's retention of lawyers for a per diem fee who served as counsel to parties in litigation,
often at NAACP urging, aimed at achieving the group's goals.'"
In Trainmen, the Court upheld a recently altered legal aid plan which
provided that each local's secretary recommend to an injured member
that he contact the union-selected attorney before making any settlement.19 The Court also further refuted the arguments advanced on behalf of state control of legal ethics by stating that the joining together
of laymen to preserve and enforce one another's federally granted rights
could not be a threat to legal ethics.20 In effect, then, Trainmen simply
amplified Button.
Even with the background of Button and Trainmen, the Illinois Supreme Court would not uphold the legal aid plan presented in United
Mine Workers.2 ' In considering the Illinois court's holding, the United
dilemma. Secondly, the litigation sought by the NAACP was aimed at achieving realization of constitutionally guaranteed civil rights so that in a balancing of equities the
state's rights of regulation appeared insufficient to justify the denial of rights to the
NAACP litigants. 371 U.S. at 444. Thirdly, litigation was the only means of political
expression available to the Negro group, for the Negro community's weak economic
position made their voice in the community unheard and their weak voting position
made the voices of their representatives unheard. The only means of participation
open to them was through the courts, for there they could act as a stronger group
would act in other branches of government. "For the Negro, litigation was like
lobbying." Zimroth, Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YAiz L.J. 966,
989-90 (1967). Thus, the situation was one in which such litigation could more easily
be brought under the protection of the first and fourteenth amendments. 371 U.S. 415,
429-30.
18. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 420-21 (1963).
19. In 1964, the Brotherhood had an investigatory staff paid entirely from union
funds, and the Brotherhood contended there had been no splitting of fees since the
Illinois Supreme Court ruling in In re Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 13 Il1.2d 391,
150 N.E.2d 163 (1958), which forbade such practices. 377 U.S. 1, 4 n.8, 5 n.9.
The Trainmen plan was accepted over a dissenting Justice Clark and Justice Black,
who distinguished Trainmen from Button by noting that the object of the litigation
protected in Trainmen was personal damages, not constitutionally guaranteed civil
rights. 377 U.S. 1, 10 (dissenting opinion).
20. Id. at 7.
21. The Illinois Supreme Court distinguished United line Workers from both
Button and Trainmen, noting that the United States Supreme Court had recognized
the right of states to regulate the legal profession so long as such regulation did not
infringe upon the rights of individuals. The Illinois court interpreted the Supreme
Court's holdings as condoning a balancing of state rights against individual rights. By
this analysis the Illinois court reasoned that the desirability of upholding the state
interest in regulating the legal profession sufficiently outweighed the undesirability of
any infringement on individual rights so as to justify the court's overruling the mine
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States Supreme Court recognized the state's right to regulate the practice

of law,- but the Court stated: "[I]t is equally apparent that rules
framed to protect the public and preserve respect for the administration
of justice can in their actual operation significantly impair the value of

associational freedoms." 23 Thus, in its balancing of state rights of regulation against individual first amendment rights, the Court concluded that

the individual rights should prevail.24
In upholding the "associational freedoms" of the mine workers, the
,Court relied heavily on Button and Trainmen. However, while the pro.grams involved in the two earlier cases both utilized solicitation among
potential litigants and provided for the handling of attorney-client com-

munications, the United Mine Workers' program provided additionally
that the union pay the attorney a flat salary for his services. ' 5 All such
intermediary practices are expressly forbidden by Canon 35 of the ABA

Canons of Professional Ethics as adopted by the Illinois State Bar
Association.

6

workers' program. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. United Mine Workers of America, Dist.
12, 35 Ill.2d 112, 123-24, 219 N.E.2d 503, 509-10 (1966).
22. In a strong dissenting opinion, Justice Harlan maintained: "[Llitigation is more
than speech; it is conduct. And the States may reasonably regulate conduct even
though it is related to expression." United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12 v.
Ill.
State Bar Ass'n, 88 S.Ct. 353, 358 (1967) (dissenting opinion).
23. Id. at 356.
24. Id. at 357.
25. Id. at 355.
26. Canon 35 reads:
The professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between
client and lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his
duties by or in the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his
client should be personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the
client. Charitable societies rendering aid to the indigent are not deemed
such intermediaries.
A lawyer may accept employment from any organization, such as an association, club or trade organization, to render legal services in any matter
in which the organization, as an entity, is interested, but this employment
should not include the rendering of legal services to the members of such
an organization in respect to their individual affairs.
This canon as applied to a fact situation in which an employer or association or
union agrees to reimburse legal costs paid by employees or members has been interpreted by the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics. The committee held such
practice to be ethical so long as the attorney is selected and employed by the member
and has no responsibility to the employer, association, or union. The committee stated,
however, that "where the lawyer is selected and employed as well as paid by the
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Supreme Court approval of the United Mine Workers' plan therefore,
signifies an extension of the principles espoused in Button and Trainmen
in that while the United Mine Workers holding rests on the same ground
as the earlier decisions, it has broadened the scope of those decisions to
allow even greater deviations from standard legal ethics to further protect the right of individuals, assembled in an organization, to secure legal
counsel for themselves.
27
The import of United Mine Workers lies in the trend it signifies,
employer or association to represent its employees or members, the employment may
well be unethical." ABA COMMiTTEE ON PRoFEssioNAL ETHics, INwowalIA. OPINION No..
469 (1961).
In another interpretation of Canon 35, the ABA Committee on the Unauthorized
Practice of Law was presented with this situation: "II. A labor union employs a
lawyer, on full time, part of whose duties is to be available to advise and assist its.
members, if they desire such assistance: (1) in connection with disputes between the
employee-member and the corporation under the union contract; (2) in connection
with their personal problems such as the drawing of wills, deeds or leases for their
dwellings, claims against third parties for injuries to persons or property, etc. The
by-laws of the union provide that they shall be entitled to this service, which is paid
for out of their dues." The committee was asked to determine whether such activities
constituted the unauthorized practice of law.
In answering the inquiry, the committee referred to the provisions of Canon 35 which
allow a lawyer to represent an organization as an entity but forbids his rendering legal
service to the organization's members. The committee then notes: "The professional
services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by any lay agency, personal
or corporate, which intervenes between client and lawyer. If such were permissible,
it would permit the corporation or lay agency to do that which the lawyer could not
do; namely, the solicitation of business. [Richmond Ass'n of Credit Men, Inc. v. The
Bar Ass'n of the City of Richmond, 167 Va. 327, 189 SE. 153 (1937)]."
While the committee concluded that the practices set out constituted the unauthorized
practice of law, the committee also stated: "However, whether it is professionally
improper for a lawyer to represent an individual member of a corporation or lay
agency, at the expense of the latter, where such representation is for the promotion
of the common interest of the shareholders of the corporation or members of the lay
agency and not merely for the benefit of the individual . . . is a matter involving
ethics alone, which this committee does not seek to pass upon." ABA COMMITTEE ON
UNAUTHORIZED PRAcInCE OF LAW, INFORM.AvE OPINION A (1950).
While the CANONS do not carry the weight of statutes, they were the standard for
the Illinois court's interpretation of the less explicitly worded statutes. Illinois State
Bar Ass'n v. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12, 35 Iil.2d 112, 119-20, 219
NXE.2d 503, 507 (1966). See ILL. REv. STATs. ch. 13.
27. There have been strong predictions as to where the trend set by United Mine
Workers will lead. Some see a further departure from the profession's standards of
ethics, Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Va., 377 U.S. 1, 9, 12 (1964) (dissenting
opinion), a demise of the attorney-client relation, noted in 65 MicH. L. Rzv. 805, 812
(1967), and a substantial commercialization of the profession, Illinois State Bar Ass'n
v. United Mine Workers of America, Dist. 12, 35 Ill.2d 112, 125, 219 N.E.2d 503, 510
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for the holding delineates a change in the Court's position regarding the
legal profession in this country. This change appears to be toward more
permissiveness, if such permissiveness is aimed at aiding a client in attain-

ing his constitutionally guaranteed freedoms, and its effect on the profession will undoubtedly be marked.
Military

Law-APPLICATION OF MIRANDA TO COURTS-MARTIAL AD-

Fourth Class Richard C. Lincoln, on trial for premeditated murder before a general court-martial, testified that he did
not intend to kill the deceased. Without initially proving that the accused had been warned of his rights, trial counsel sought to impeach his
testimony with statements Lincoln had made at a pretrial interrogation.
The statements were admitted as evidence and Lincoln was subsequently
convicted of voluntary manslaughter. The sentence was approved by the
convening authority and affirmed by the Army Board of Review.
In reversing the Board's decision, the Court of Military Appeals held
that without prior proof of compliance with the warnings against selfincrimination set forth in Miranda v. Arizona' and United States v.
Tempia,2 allowing the introduction of an admission used to impeach the
MISSIONS. Specialist

accused's testimony was prejudicial error and a denial of due process of

law.'
Due process has always been guaranteed to the armed forces of the
United States,4 however, military due process had been defined as the fair
and uniform application of military law enacted by Congress. 5 Consequently, military courts were bound by Article 31 of the Uniform Code
(1966). In considering United Mine Workers, the Illinois Supreme Court felt that upholding the Mine Workers program might lead unions to expand into the offering
of legal advice in areas unrelated to the members' jobs. The court also saw the possibility of any group with a similarity of interests being allowed to form to hire an
attorney to deal with individual problems. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v. United Mine
Workers of America, Dist. 12, supra at 510. One writer, looking ahead to the
United Mine Workers holding, concluded that, taken together, Button, Trainmen, and
United Mine Workers may well establish "a strong impetus for reform." Zimroth,
,Group Legal Services and the Constitution, 76 YALE LJ. 966, 984 (1967).
1. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
2. 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 137 C.M.R. 249 (1967).
S. United States v. Lincoln, 17 U.S.C.M.A. 330, 38 C.M.R. 128 (1967).
4. E.g., Reaves v. Ainsworth, 219 U.S. 296, 304 (1910).
5. French v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 326 (1922); United States v. Grisby, 335 F.2d 652 (4th
Cir. 1964); Innes v. Hiatt, 141 F.2d 664 (3d Cir. 1944).

